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Advanced products such as aircraft distinguish themselves by a number of characteristics. 
Products  are complicated  and produced under very complicated circumstances, but also  
have a very long life. The purchase price, therefore,  is  a small part of  total user cost of the 
product.  Product value, hence, increases the more of cost efficient maintenance that has been 
built into the product  and the easier it is to service and modernize. 
Advanced products also distinguish themselves by featuring the  additional collective 
characteristic of  a “cloud of technology spillovers” available to external users in proportion 
to their competence  to commercialize them. While the value of that cloud  to society may be 
greater than that of the product itself  the value to the user may be much smaller. The 
producer, therefore, faces a tricky pricing problem and the value he can capture   depends on 
his ability to charge for the dual product.  
I discuss joint production of products with rich spillovers in the context of  joint 
customership, i.e. public purchasing of both products and the collective value generated by 
spillovers. I demonstrate that a win-win situation might exist between the two that improves 
with the  commercial ability of the local economy to capture the value of the spillovers. 
Industrial participation programs can be made part of a sale to support the receiver 
competence of local producers to capture the spillover rents. Part of marketing the product, 
therefore, involves the ability to present a credible case for the economic value to society  of 
the spillovers and to design a method  of charging for them (Innovative pricing). A well 
designed, mutually beneficial contract should make both parties to the trade winners. This 
latter form of innovative pricing should be particularly attractive for developing countries. 
The theoretical argument is illustrated with the case of downstream industrial business 
formation around Swedish Aircraft industry.   
JEL Code; D23, D24, L15, L23, L62, M13, O31. 
Key words: integrated production, competence blocs, joint customership, receiver 
competence, spillovers, organizational learning, technology diffusion.  
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1.  Introduction 
The modern economy has evolved ever more advanced, multidimensional  and 
complex products that combine high levels of scientific and engineering inputs 
both in their design and in the processes for producing them. Such products pose 
special problems that require innovation  in pricing, marketing, and property 
rights characterization, problems that have scarcely been recognized by 
economists, and whose special properties have yet to be adequately investigated 
and accommodated within the discipline. This paper identifies the essential 
features of complex high-tech multidimensional products and markets and 
provides a framework for understanding and assessing high-tech industry´s role 
in the market economy and its relationship to government. As an empirical case 
that illustrates and clarifies the central point, I use the Swedish aircraft industry. 
 
2.  The Pricing of complex and multidimensional systems products   
Advance products such as aircraft distinguish themselves by a number of 
characteristics. First of all they are complicated systems products that are 
manufactured by complex processes, both of which result from large 
expenditures on research and development; cost efficient repair, maintenance, 
and upgrading are increasingly incorporated in their design to facilitate service 
and modernization. Such products therefore  have a very long life. All these 
product features  imply that the direct cost of production is only a fraction of the 
total value of the product to the potential user. Therefore, the price should 
include the value of services the product delivers over its life cycle. Following 
the logic of this characterization, producers have begun to change the property 
rights characteristics of their product; they increasingly own it and sell the 
services it delivers to the user, sometimes  postponing some of the charges to 
later stages of the life of the product, and in this way recoup more of    3   
development costs.  Military procurement of complex products are built on a 
similar ownership logic. The military customer   is often intimately involved in 
the product design and often contributes significant user knowledge, thereby 
directly influencing the definition of the product. Because of the considerable 
technical risk involved in developing such a complex product the military 
buyer/public customer often shares in the risks and contributes significant 
advance payments. After delivery the military owns the product, but its early 
involvement in the  design process means that the life time cost of the product to 
the user can be minimized
2. Civilian procurement of aircraft and aircraft engines 
and of other complex systems products  have increasingly adopted a similar 
ownership logic. The role of the competent customer in shaping new technology 
development therefore must be seriously addressed in the analysis of economic 
growth, and, as we will see, the changing relative roles in that respect between 
public and private customers have to be specially considered. 
 The producer of compelx and expensive products often both retains ownership 
of the product , finances it and sometimes  installs and services it and charges 
for the services  generated by the product in use, say the engine  of an aircraft. 
This complexity is further enhanced by the increasing practice of 
technologically advanced  systems  producers  to focus their resources on the 
high end of the value chain developing and designing the product, outsourcing  
physical production  and then returning to the customer  to take responsibility 
for the running , the  servicing and the  upgrading of  the product system. 
Swedish Ericsson has increasingly moved in that direction  when it comes to its 
main product, mobile telecom systems . In both cases it is in the interest of the 
producer to design the product system such that the life time cost of using the 
product is minimized. With large parts of total production outsourced  the 
interaction between the systems coordinator/ “customer” and its specialist 
                                                 
2 This practice was   particularly elaborate during the development of the 
Swedish Gripen multipurpose combat aircraft that was initiated in 1980.   4   
subcontractors becomes one of mutual learning of the increasingly important 
industrial technology of distributed and integrated production ( Eliasson 1996b) 
that is currently carrying  the globalization of world production, but that is also 
tending to shut out subcontractors, notably in developing economies that have 
difficulties mastering the necessary techniques of exact measurement, precision 
manufacturing of well defined components and  quality control, and to observe 
delivery commitments. 
Second, advanced products also distinguish themselves by being surrounded by  
a “ cloud of related  new technology “ or so called spillovers. Thus, for instance, 
Swedish  Ericsson  probably would not have become the world´s leading mobile 
systems producer today without the technology spillovers from its military 
electronics arm ( see case further on). In the Ericsson case the spillovers were 
picked up and profited from  internally. To charge for spillovers  picked up 
externally by other firms  is , however,  more difficult and often impossible 
because of weak property rights. This is where innovative pricing ( Jonason 
1999, 2001) and cooperative  agreements come in so as to provide an indirect 
means of compensation to the producer. 
In  “ advanced public purchasing” of  the kind utilized for military aircraft, 
submarines, and public telecommunications systems the weak property rights 
problem can be to some extent attended to because of  the dual interests of the 
public customer in both the product itself and “ the cloud” (“ joint 
customership”). Three circumstances, however, have complicated the problem  
extending   the public dimension of these spillovers to the private sector: (i) 
previous public, or semi public activities like telecommunications are 
increasingly becoming privatized; (ii) traditional  industry, private or semi 
private, increasingly uses advanced products of the kind we are talking about, 
for instance large commercial airlines, the media and entertainment industry and 
global transport systems; (iii) the existence of a hi-tech industry such as the very   5   
rare capacity to develop an entire generation of military fighter jets becomes a 
positive ” quality brand ” that spills over to the other industries of the same 
industry, and if cleverly attended to allows firms in that industry to charge more 
for their products.  An upcoming semi public market , furthermore, is security 
that is intimately linked to military  and defense technology. The defense against 
terrorism (see below) in fact  has to effectively exploit current military 
technology. So, while the industrial domain rich in spillovers has expanded, the 
property rights and economic incentive problems associated with generating 
them have become more complicated. 
A third factor concerning the value and pricing of spillovers is the ability in the 
local “ capture market” to discover, evaluate and commercialize technological 
spillovers. The economic  value of spillovers is directly dependent on that ability 
and the willingness of prospective users to invest in the commercialization of 
spillovers. 
In that respect advanced public  purchasing has certain unique and interesting 
features: the public customer has an interest in both receiving the product and 
capturing as large a value of the spillovers ( for the country) as is possible. The  
product itself and its spillovers constitute - in effect - joint production. As a 
corollary,  this implies that such products also involve joint consumption or 
customership.  
Contrary to privately generated spillovers, both the product and the cloud of 
spillovers
3 now represent economic value to society at large and to its 
representative government.  And the better the economy in commercializing 
spillovers the more such “ social economic”  value that is created. We explain 
this in terms of competence bloc theory. This is also one  rationale for 
organizing industrial policy in the form of sophisticated public purchasing to 
obtain a well defined product,  rather than  in the form of direct subsidies of 
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R&D, an input in the technology supply process without well defined uses. 
Public purchasing means that the economy receives something useful  for its 
money, namely a product that functions plus the undefined spillovers.  
Hence, the high-tech firm functions both  as a supplier of demanded goods and 
services and as a   de facto,  but unintentional, private technical university in 
supplying technology to the economy without being able to charge for it.  Since 
Governments across the industrial world are willing to pay for technical 
universities supplying similar, but more  undefined technical and educational 
services one would expect  governments also to be willing to pay extra for these  
more valuable spillovers that benefit  the economy at large.  Public  purchasing 
of such products, hence,  provides indirect public funding of that privately run 
university (Eliasson 1996b).  Spillovers from advanced firms, furthermore,  are 
probably superior to spillovers from technical universities since  advanced 
public purchasing projects  take the new technology closer to the market in the 
form of products that are demanded and that function compared to the 
unspecified technology supply that is generated by a  technical university.  
When the public  purchasing has been competitive the new technology, 
furthermore, is not only functional but   also economically sorted and  efficient.  
To achieve a desired and rational   pricing of its products and services  the 
producer engaging in public purchasing deals therefore needs a complementary 
marketing   ability to demonstrate the economic value to the customer , or to 
society of the joint product, both the product itself  and its spillovers. A potential 
to create a win-win situation between producer and customer exists, but even 
though the interest in seeing it realized is mutual, the practical  tasks of 
identifying the opportunities, of  realizing them and (therefore)  of taking the 
initiatives  rest largely with the commercial ability of the producer.  
To summarize, the pricing problem consists in demonstrating to the customer 
the economic value of the intangible cloud of technological spillovers in   7   
addition to the user value of the product itself. The marketing strategy, to be 
efficient, therefore, may require active support of the customer ibn creating the 
competence needed to commercialize spillovers locally. Such a support could 
come in the form of  well designed industrial participation programs and is in 
the interest of both parties to the transaction. In fact, the often large differences 
between social and private returns to R&D investments calculated  (see below) 
illustrate the economic value of such spillovers. The new awareness also  
brought in through this paper is that this value depends positively on the local 
receiver competence, or ability  to commercialize spillovers. Hence, a brief 
survey of the econometric spillover literature will follow below. 
With this pricing discussion I have   attached a double meaning to the concept of 
efficiency. It is economically inefficient for the production of advanced products 
and services not to market the dual product and to make arrangements to capture 
as much as  possible of such value from the spillovers as possible.  It is socially 
inefficient  for the customer , and the public customer in particular, not to be 
concerned with locally capturing that value. Demands for offset trade signals an 
awareness of that possibility, but  in practice has  often been  an inefficient way 
for both parties to the deal and especially so if short term employment benefits 
are asked for rather than economically filtered  technology transfers. 
  
3.  Joint manufacturing of products and intangible spillovers 
Let us define  product characteristics in terms of 
  a)  Functional requirements of user/ customer (FR.) 
b)   Production costs
4 
                                                 
4 This is all in terms of axiomatic design (Suh 1990) language. Functional requirements stand for a vector of 
product characteristics, and DP (Design Parameters) for the minimum of design parameters needed to achieve 
FR through the production and technology matrix {A}. Suh´s model recognizes the general industrial experience 
that there are many  ways ( many matrixes {A} ) through which FR can be achieved but that industrial practice is 
not always such that the producer achieves specified FR at minimum possible costs.  Incentives , competition 
and competent purchasing on the part of the customer  may enforce minimum cost practice, but Suh`s model is a   8   
  c)   Repair, servicing and maintenance attributes. 
  d)   Updating potential. 
  e)   Associated intangible spillovers. 
Purchasing contracts are usually negotiated  on a) and b). As an additional functional 
characteristic of the product  c) is increasingly becoming an issue as the ownership of the 
product is redefined,   for instance in the procurement of  large aircraft engines, where the 
 producer increasingly owns the product and charges for  its use. The demands for updating 
potential   (d) is a difficult question for the producer since  as much as 70-80 percent of 
manufacturing productivity (Suh 1990, p. 41) is determined at early design phases. Intangible 
spillovers  (e) are normally forgotten altogether in the pricing decision
5. 
There are two types of uncertainty associated with the development and manufacturing of an 
advanced product. 
(1)  Performance  to specification (technological uncertainty). 
(2)  Control of internal productivity and  prices  (economic uncertainty). 
If the customer desires significant new technology development as part of product design 
great technological uncertainty is seen to exist. Normally the producer has no method of 
reliable calculation. When the producer has no real information advantage over the purchaser 
a (technological) risk sharing contract is the normal solution. In fact, in advanced public 
military purchasing, the customer is often a significant technology contributor who 
understands the product technology and the production organization  well. Once product 
technology is under control costs of development and production become more easily 
calculable. Here, the producer has a clear information advantage. The balance between (1) 
and (2) is, of course, reflected in the contract. 
With new, untested product technology one expects cost plus pricing to govern, with a large 
part of the risk being taken on by the customer. Since new untested technology should  spill 
more technology when developed it would even  be in the interest of a rational public 
                                                                                                                                                          
method to structure and make the production process and its choices clear both to the producer and the customer. 
In fact, in the case of purchasing of complex systems products  the customer and the provider normally have to 
interact on the basis of a minimum  common understanding of each other´s business. Suh´s method can help to 
structure that understanding. 
5  and  rarely entered directly into the contract, except sometimes as local employment commitments on the part 
of the seller. Such short-term commitments are normally an inefficient arrangement, often unrelated to the main 
contract and of little value to both parties.     
   9   
purchaser to cover a larger share of the risk, since the public value of the spillovers becomes 
larger.    
When functional requirements  are standard, tested and normal, calculable flexibility is asked 
for and we have a case for design-to-cost pricing. The buyer sets a price and specifies the 
minimum product performance characteristics. The negotiation, or the competition then is 
about what more the producer can offer at that price.  
One would expect  rational producers not to do more than they get paid for. However, a 
generous contract might very well be designed to allow for experimentation with, for 
instance, new technology on the part of the producer, or for that reason taking on a higher cost 
domestic subcontractor because of the benefit of closer cooperation and fewer manufacturing 
errors. The purchasing contract between the  Swedish defense materials procurement agency 
(FMV), the representative customer of the Swedish  government and the  IG- JAS  industrial 
group formed in 1980  (and  headed by Saab) to develop the JAS-Gripen multipurpose 
combat aircraft practiced design-to- cost pricing far more systematically than in other  defense 
purchases and therefore left  less leeway for high cost Swedish subcontractors than was the 
case with the purchase of the predecessor to Gripen, the Viggen jet fighter. This can be 
interpreted in two ways. In standard economic parlance the Government this time (through its 
defense materials procurement agency  FMV ) was both  tough and competent. In terms of 
our logic one could also argue that Government was less willing to pay for the generation of 
spillovers. 
One would also expect the producer, facing a tough negotiation on the purchasing (a and b) 
side to use his information advantage and accept a low price for well defined FRs, but save on 
(c) and resist demands on (d) and then capture part of the profit on later maintenance and 
upgrading. From the customer point of view this is, however, less efficient. As a rule 
spillovers are determined by the product specification and not negotiable (excluding offset 
requirements), but the less of new technology development associated with the FRs the 
smaller the cloud of spillovers. Hence, both the customer and the producer should get a better 
deal on the a and b side if it can give a credible presentation of the value of embodied low 
cost maintenance and upgrading, and above all on the intangible spillovers under (e), and 
offer support to the customer in capturing the spillovers. A rational public customer should 
focus on (e) and ask for support in capturing the spillovers. Obviously, having an information 
advantage the outcome for the producer/seller improves with its ability to present a credible   10   
story. Risk sharing and incentive contracts increase in importance  when both parties are 
equally informed about the value of spillovers. 
 For instance, the Swedish Government and its representative purchaser (FMV) demanded
6 
that the Jas-Gripen consortium should get the most efficient low cost subcontractors, thus 
minimizing the resources available to the subcontractors to develop new technology. 
Consequently contracts went abroad to foreign subcontractors of complex components that 
could modify already developed subsystems or  components, for instance the landing gear. 
Only large subcontractors such as Ericsson and Volvo were able to take on large development 
projects and finance them internally, later to use the new technology in other projects. It is an 
interesting question to ask how well informed about the economics of advanced purchasing 
the public purchaser was when it squeezed the Jas-Gripen consortium so hard  [under (b)] that 
less margin than before was available for product development, and, hence, most probably 
less spillovers were generated. 
 
 
4.  The Nature of Intangible Spillovers 
Intangible spillovers are difficult to define since they only become visible as they are 
recognized and  made use of. The pick up rate depends on the local receiver competence or 
absorptive capacity (Eliasson 1986, pp. 47 f, 1990a, Cohen-Levinthal 1990). 
 
4.1  The existence and magnitude of spillovers 
There is a large econometric literature demonstrating  the  existence  of the cloud of spillovers 
around advanced firms, most of the literature originating in the US and being presented under 
the heading of “technological spillovers” or “general purpose technologies” (for an early 
survey see Eliasson 1997). 
The main empirical story is that productivity in firms and industries increases with increases 
in investments in R&D,  R&D intensity being normally defined as the  proxy for  being 
technologically advanced. But increases in productivity, although not as large, may also be 
registered  in related firms. Bernstein and Mohnen (1994)   studied  (1) the effects of own 
R&D spending on own productivity, (2) the productivity effects in related US firms and (3) 
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the productivity effects in related Japanese firms. They  found that the Japanese firms were 
better than the “closer” US firms to exploit technology developed in advanced US firms . 
In economic jargon technological spillovers are an externality,  a term introduced  by Alfred 
Marshall (1890) signifying that they cannot be explained within the standard (and static) 
economic model. In the wake of the oil crises of the 1970s and the following unexpected and 
long  stagflation period  many economists attempted to remedy this deficiency of mainstream 
economic theory under the ponderous title of “New Growth Theory” which they claimed to 
have endogenized and explained economic growth.
7 
The existence of positive externalities or spillovers or unaccounted for infrastructure capital 
means that output is being observed that cannot be linked to  a corresponding registered 
resource input. This, for the same reason means that private and social rates of return to 
capital will differ because some of the capital input in production has not been properly 
accounted for. This  is a common problem in economic accounting, notably when it comes to 
accounting for the presence of knowledge capital. During the early part of the post WorldWar 
II period economists discussed  the technical residual or the mystic technology factor or total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth that “explained” a growing part of total manufacturing 
growth and by the early 1970s almost all  growth, only to suddenly disappear as mystically as 
it had arrived during the 1970s (Denison 1961,1967,1979). Solow´s (1957,1959) production 
analysis marks the beginning of this discussion. Erik Lundberg´s (1961) so called Horndal 
effect added a degree of mystery to the observations that Arrow (1962b) attempted to clear up 
by his “learning - by - doing “ model.  
Unexplained technology generation was the standard explanation until Jorgenson and 
Griliches (1967) managed to more or less eliminate the technical residual or total factor 
productivity growth by correcting factor inputs in production as recorded in the national 
accounts. The J&G (1967) method comes close to our problem of measuring the value of 
spillovers. Their method, which is still controversial, is to  impute the value of unaccounted 
for inputs from a hypothetical  market value of the  products
8.  When Jorgenson and Fraumeni 
(1992) applied the same method to the US education industry  they found that US educational 
                                                 
7 First man out  was Romer (1986). At close inspection, however, growth in the “New  Growth models” is also 
carried  by an exogenous equilibrium trend, and hence do not embody much  more endogeneity than the standard  
neoclassical growth models, e g those used by the Jorgenson workshop ( see further below). 
8 The method has been criticized for being tautological , but the problem is rather the strong assumptions  about 
the existence of a known external equilibrium that one has to make.   12   
output   accounted for far more of US production  growth than previously estimated in other 
studies.  
Similar results have been obtained from cost benefit based spillover  studies indicating social 
rates of return on R&D investments far above the corresponding private returns, being in 
Canada as high as ten times (or more) the private return (Bernstein and Yau 1995). Nadiri 
(1993), contrary to common opinion, also found little  evidence of decreasing returns to 
increased R&D investment, a conclusion that very much signaled the later superior economic 
performance of the US economy after 1995
9. Nadiri thus concluded that R&D in Western 
firms generates great spillovers and that the large difference between social and private 
returns indicated significant underinvestment in R&D among these firms. The implication of 
this, he concluded,  is that a nation that allows the opportunities to capitalize on that 
knowledge base in industry slip by will be on a losing track. 
From this, however, does not follow that government should step in to increase its 
infrastructure spending on R&D, as is the argument behind most input based industrial policy. 
Measaured  unexplained value creation is a market filtered output and a significant 
commercial resource input is needed to transform R&D spending into valuable output.  First, 
advanced firms in these spillover  studies normally have a high R&D intensity in production. 
Second, most studies are based on US data and describe a   positive relationships between  
R&D intensity and productivity in own and related firms . A selection effect therefore afflicts 
most of these results. Effects of R&D spending on firm growth not only take a long time in 
showing, which means that  firms  engaged in R&D spending  that have experienced  positive 
results   dominate the  statistics. This is so because  failed  firms have either reduced R&D 
spending, reduced   operations or dropped out of the market. The  conclusion to increase R&D 
and you will automatically enjoy more economically valuable spillovers therefore does not 
hold as a policy guideline. 
The strongest economic  filtering of technology  is to be found in the financial markets. The 
strongest industrial spillovers also appear to originate in privately financed R&D carried out 
in private firms where the allocation of resources have been through a double market filter. 
Publicly funded research carried out in private firms comes in second, and the lowest 
                                                 
9 Later, Mun and Nadiri (2002) observed that IT externalities in US private industries over the period 1984 – 
2000  were stronger than other externalities, and explained considerable parts of TFP growth, notably in service 
industries, that are characterized by significant interindustry transactions. One should add here that the 
introduction of distributed production across manufacturing industry should mean an increase in the same 
characteristics (Eliasson 1996b).   13   
spillover effects are recorded for publicly funded research in publicly run research 
laboratories (Nadiri – Mamuneas 1994, Eliasson 1997, pp. 241 f). This, hence, is a negative 
result for university research and runs against the suggestions of Arrow (1962a) to improve 
innovative efficiency by establishing publicly run and financed industrial R&D laboratories  
that should then make the innovations available for free to firms. It rather supports the idea 
expressed by “the advanced firm as a technical university” of Eliasson (1965, 1996b) that it  
is  more productive if R&D investments are decided on, carried out by  and also financed by 
private firms (Mammuneas and Nadiri 1995). 
Intangible spillovers come in different shapes. First, to exemplify from our case study, we 
have the closely related, within industry spillovers, one step beyond internal firm use (the 
core industry in the inner circle of Figure 1). Here, we would expect to find spillovers running 
back and forth between  aircraft manufacturers and aircraft engine manufacturers. The more 
fragmented by outsourcing industry becomes the more important these spillovers, and the 
more urgent it becomes to find a way of mutual recognition and compensation. In public 
purchasing we also  have a case of joint customership and it should  become easy for 
Government to motivate a higher price for the product as a compensation for spillovers. 
Silicon Valley and the  South German luxury car production cluster offer another case, that of 
a competence bloc populated with advanced firms that both benefit from the spillover source 
and contribute to it (Eliasson – Eliasson 2005a). 
        (Figure 1 in about here)  
The next step (second) takes us further out to the second circle; related (to aircraft industry) 
technology including air navigation and safety, air traffic control etc.; a rapidly growing IT 
intensive industry. If unmanned air traffic becomes a reality this might constitute an important 
growth area, as would security industry in general and recent firm interviews conducted 
within this project indicate that the aircraft industry is moving in this direction. 
Third, however, many devices and technological developments in the core aircraft industry 
find profitable applications all over engineering. It is no coincidence that a Swedish computer 
industry originated among the high quality users of numerical calculation techniques 
(industrial simulation) in  Saab  in the early 1960s. The Saab  combat aircraft Viggen 
developed during the 1960s and first delivered in 1971 also used on board computerization 
extensively and developed technology that would later come to be used to support distributed 
manufacturing ( See further below). This generic quality of aircraft technology makes it   14   
appropriate to say (as in Eliasson 1995) that aircraft industry already today uses the 
technologies of future engineering industry. 
Finally we have the unpredictable serendipitous spillovers in the outer circle
10. For instance, 
while it should  not come as a surprise that a Swedish aircraft engine manufacturing activity 
developed within Volvo
11 as a spillover of Swedish aircraft industry, it is more difficult to 
understand that Ericsson mobile telephony owes a lot to military electronics development (see 
below). 
The ability to capture the spillovers in the different circles also requires very different receiver 
competencies on the part of local industry. It also depends on the channels of diffusion of the 
same spillovers. 
 
4.2  Diffusion channels 
Table 1 lists the six main channels of technology diffusion. The most discussed channel is 
outright imitation – the Japanese way (Cf Bernstein and Mohnen 1994) – (item 5), when 
development costs are carried by US firms and the spillover  rents captured by the Japanese 
firms. Econometric research – as mentioned - lends support to the existence of that channel of 
diffusion. 
It is, however, important to emphasize that technology diffusion only to a minor extent is 
about the diffusion of “solutions” already developed (“patents”). The important form of 
diffusion occurs when a group of people has learnt to solve a particular type of technical 
problem and moves on to a new project or starts a new firm that can benefit from its 
experience. The most important avenue of technology or competence diffusion, therefore, is 
the market for competence, when people with competence move between jobs and firms (item 
1). The same type of learning (item 3) occurs when firms/subcontractors learn from one 
another when working together. Increasingly, firms also acquire complementary technology 
(item 4) through strategic acquisitions. 
        (Table 1 in about here) 
                                                 
10 The word serendipity originates in Horace Walpole’s (ca. 1754) The Three Princes of Serendip who had an 
aptitude for making fortunate discoveries accidentally. 
11 Volvo acquired Nohab Flygmotor (founded 1930) in 1941. After a couple of name changes it is, since 1994, 
Volvo Aero Corp.   15   
Another form of diffusion and/or activation of technologies (item 2) occurs through spin offs 
from larger firms. This is perhaps even more important than the movement of people, since it 
often means that winning technologies about to be shelved by conservative big business firms 
are activated by an understanding entrepreneur, often a group of employees within the firm, 
jumping ship  to start their own business. Most of Silicon Valley, in fact, has that origin. At 
the same time university entrepreneurship, meaning the industrial exploitation of university 
research results, while probably being less important  (Eliasson 1997, 2000b) has been more 
discussed in literature (Jaffe 1989, Nelson 1986, Stankiewitz 1986). University research to 
become industrialized requires strong support of a complete  and broad-based competence 
bloc (next section). 
Finally, research and internal learning in incumbent firms (item 6) is a not to be forgotten 
source of long run growth that involves considerable diffusion of technology within the 
company.      The bulk of R&D expenditures in advanced firms is devoted to picking up 
internationally available complementary technology to integrate with their  existing 
knowledge base, and only a small fraction to genuinely new technology development. The 
multinational firms are specialists in this field (Eliasson 1991a, 1997:12ff), and, supporting 
this , Keller (2001) observes that recent research shows the major source of technical change 
leading to productivity growth among OECD countries is foreign, not domestic.  
 
4.3  Competence bloc theory and the critical role of the advanced customer 
Creation, commercialization and diffusion of technology require  market support. Incentives 
to create and commercialize have to be in place and projects have to be exposed to a 
maximum of varied and competent evaluation to minimize the risk of losing a winner and 
keeping losers for too long on the budget (Table 2A). A viable and complete competence bloc 
12 is needed for this optimization of the selection process that results in the entry (Table 2B) 
of winning projects/firms and more competition from incumbent firms. The critical role in 
that selection of the advanced customer is unique to competence bloc theory.  
Customer competence and contributions 
The fundamental understanding of competence bloc theory  is that in the long term the quality 
of products will be limited from above by the competence  of customers to understand the 
                                                 
12 Competence bloc theory was first formulated in Eliasson and Eliasson 1996. The currently most complete 
presentation can be found in Eliasson 2001a, 2005:Ch I,  Eliasson and Eliasson (2005b, 2008) and in Johansson 
(2007).    16   
qualities of the product,  their willingness to pay and their contribution of user competence to 
the development of new technology
13. A competent and wealthy customer base constitutes a 
competitive advantage  of an economy.
14 The availability of specialist subcontractors within 
the competence bloc, furthermore, allows individual firms to enjoy economies of scale 
through the system. A complete competence bloc, hence, allows through its mixture of market 
and hierarchical coordination a dynamically efficient combination of  innovative ability and 
industrial scale (Eliasson and Eliasson 2005b). 
 In the end this paper will highlight the different interests of the public and the private 
customer, in effect meaning that they regard the same product differently. A rational public 
customer should be concerned that the cloud of spillovers be commercialized locally to a 
maximum possible extent, indirectly making public purchases an instrument of industrial 
policy. The private customer cannot be expected to entertain the same social concerns, even 
though it may be interested in commercializing the spillovers alone or together with a partner, 
to the extent it makes ( private) economic sense.
15  
          ( Tables 2A, 2B and 2C in about here) 
Technology supply 
The complete competence bloc features competent customers (item 1 in Table 2C) that 
contribute technology to producers by participating in development work. This is typical of 
aircraft industry. Innovators that combine old and new technologies into new composite 
technologies are important actors in the technology supply  process (item 2). It makes 
economic sense to give innovators a technical definition even though Joseph Schumpeter 
(1911, 1942) was not clear on this point. 
16  
                                                 
13 As argued by Day (1986) this latter interdependence of demand and supply poses difficult methodological 
problems in economic theory. 
14 The comparative advantage for a nation of an advanced local customer base was recognized already by 
Burenstam-Linder (1961). 
15 Again, to anticipate  the  industrial policy discussion below there will always be a general policy argument for 
supporting the development of local commercialization/receiver competence to capture spillovers from public 
and private procurement. It is more difficult to argue generally for more advanced public purchasing since it 
means arguing for a large public sector and it is by no means clear that the public purchaser is more competent as 
a customer than the corresponding private one. Only if the market is not responding to a private demand, or if the 
product is a clear public good will there be a rational argument for a representative public customer to step in, for 
instance in defense procurement. We leave this difficult issue at  that here. 
16 This technical definition of the innovator has its origin in von Mises (1949). On this I prefer to think in terms 
of innovations as being generated by a technology system ( Carlsson 1995) or a technology production function 
(Griliches 1979, 1984,1986)   17   
But technology supply is not sufficient to guarantee economic growth. Technologies have to 
be identified and commercialized and this is the phase when critical project selection occurs, 




 Entrepreneurs (item 3) have to be present in the own firm or in the market to identify the 
commercial potential of some of these innovations. The entrepreneur, however, also needs 
funding, and for entrepreneurs in radically new industries the venture capitalist  has to 
understand the commercial potential of what the entrepreneur has  offered to provide funding 
at reasonable costs. The venture capitalist in turn will want to exit (item 5) and return to new 
ventures, and hand over the task of taking winners to industrial scale production and 
distribution to the industrialist (item 6). The exit markets are increasingly populated by 
private equity investors and the development of markets for complementary technology 
purchasing and strategic acquisitions that facilitate the industrialization process are becoming 
increasingly important as the distributed production technology of the global economy 
develops. 
 The functions of the competence bloc support each other synergistically. The degree of  
completeness of the competence bloc therefore determines the functionality of the entire bloc. 
Without functioning exit markets the venture capitalist has no way of capturing the full profit 
potential of his venture, except becoming an industrialist on his own. And he is normally not 
the competent person to do that. So the existence of competent industrialists to carry the 
winners selected at earlier stages on to industrial scale production influences  the incentives of 
the entire system. But the entrepreneurs are dependent on the existence of venture capitalists 
and so on.  
One competent venture capitalist is, however, not sufficient to understand and evaluate the 
entire supply of innovative propositions from an entrepreneurial society. Creative innovation 
supplies are always broader than the local supply of experience based  commercialization 
competence (Eliasson 2005;:39ff). Hence  many competing actors of each kind and with 
varied competences  ( the horizontal dimension of the  competence bloc) are needed to 
maximize the exposure of each innovation to a competent evaluation.   18   
Furthermore, the more winners that are carried through the competence bloc the larger the 
potential for learning and creating new combinations of technologies (innovation potential). 
When the critical mass for endogenous industrial development has been reached the 
competence bloc will become a strong attractor for new entrants looking for new 
complementary technology, but because of competition, only competent entrants, that also 
contribute competence to the bloc, will survive. A vertically complete and horizontally 
sufficiently varied competence bloc that has reached critical mass will minimize the risk of 
losing a winner. Formulated differently, a potential winner faces increasing returns to 
continued search for resources through a complete competence bloc. On the other hand the 
absence of a range of actors in each actor category may make the entire incentive structure 
supported by the competence bloc collapse. 
  
As can be seen, the competence bloc has an end product market definition. Technology or 
technology systems (Carlsson 1995) , on the other hand, are an input that enters an economic 
evaluation process through the innovation slot 2 in the competence bloc (Table 2C). 
Spillovers are thus  industrial, not technical, i.e. technologies supplied from the R&D process 
that have been sorted by commercial market criteria. Since successful and recorded spillovers 
have  been tested in the market they embody both technology and economic or commercial 
knowledge. Technological spillovers – the common term – hence,  is a misnomer.  
Competitive market selection, therefore, raises the productivity effects out of a given 
technology supply (Eliasson 1996b) and commercialization through a complete competence 
bloc is a means to achieve that. Effective industrial policy through competent public 
purchasing of advanced products, hence, needs the   support of  full fledged competence blocs 
that in turn support competition in the local economy and  raise the economic value of 
spillovers from R&D spending in advanced firms .  
 
5.  The Value of Intangible Spillovers 
The value of spillovers has a collective (social) and a private part. Both depend on the 
capacity of actors to build a business on them.  
5.1  Receiver competence   19   
The capacity  to commercialize technology  (receiver competence , Eliasson 1986, pp. 47f, 
1990a, Cohen – Levinthal 1990) is both technical and economic. Hence, capturing the rent 
depends on (1) the possibility to link property rights to the spillovers, (2) the capacity to build 
a business on them and/or (3) the ability to charge for them (Innovative Pricing). Patents or 
copy rights are the most common ways to link property rights to spillovers.  Vertical 
integration or joint ventures (items 3 and 4 in Table 5) are common attempts to capture the 
rents based on an asymmetric information or competence situation. Saab has done it internally 
(see next section) through starting fully owned companies on the basis of technologies 
developed around its aircraft business (e.g. Saab Combitech). Another way is to build a new 
division to appropriate own spillover technology [for instance Data Saab, see Eliasson 
(1998)]. A third way is to organize a joint venture with a group of internal innovators and 
contribute venture financing. Lacking ways of directly charging for their spillovers many 
large firms have started their own venture capital businesses to appropriate the rents from 
their own “spilled technology”.  Compensation comes in the form of capital gains or joint 
ownership. A fourth way is, of course, to let an internal inventor do it on his own, and charge 
a licensee fee for what has been developed in the company, or just (which is more common) 
to let the inventors/innovators take their ideas with them and do it on their own. Then the 
innovator/entrepreneur who commercializes the spillover will capture  the profits in the form 
of capital gains if the spin off is a success. But this path or diffusion channel runs across 
markets and  is a high-risk path. Success depends critically on the existence of a complete and 
viable competence bloc (item 2 in Table 3). Also here, however, a joint venture between the 
entrepreneur and the venture capital arm of his earlier employer is a possible and common 
solution. 
 (Table 3 in about here) 
Receiver competence is, hence, critical for the value of spillovers. The more important 
receiver competence the less difficult  the problem of charging for information. If the imitator 
cannot pick up your idea (knowledge) without your help you can sell the knowledge over and 
over again because you have to provide user (receiver) competence as well. Technology 
transfer programs and offset trade arrangements - if competently organized - are illustrations 
(item 5 in Table 3). The only really valuable offset trade to the receiver country is offset trade 
that involves support in implementing the industrial user competence in the local economy. 
The weak ownership to spillovers, however, changes character in the case of public 
procurement . Now a policy dimension is added to the procurement.   20   
5.2  Capturing the rents from spillovers – joint customership and industrial participation 
programs  as a joint policy and business opportunity 
Spillovers diffuse because of the potential rents they carry. There are incentives for both 
parties to the transaction to capture these rents, but the difficulties are large because of weak 
property rights (for the producer) and lacking receiver competence (for the buyer)
17. This very 
fact, however, establishes a situation of strong mutual interest. The situation of strong mutual 
interest is further strengthened if a Government is the buyer and a situation of joint 
customership prevails. We then have    a case for explicit producer – customer cooperation as 
a general policy case. This  policy opportunity is most appropriate for advanced industrial 
nations and has to do with the existence of complete competence blocs to support the 
capturing of “further  out” (in the circles of Figure 1) spillovers.  The larger the captive area 
the higher the probability that radically new technologies will be identified and 
commercialized. All Scandinavian economies are therefore more “ efficient” in that respect 
than Sweden alone. The argument in Eliasson (1999) was that a joint Nordic purchase of 
submarines (The Viking Project) would increase the pick up rate of spillovers in the area as a 
whole. Europe at large, for the same reason, would  create an even better such industrial 
policy opportunity, even though it would be difficult/ impossible to predict “which country” 
would capture which spillovers. In fact, and following up on the argument above competition 
among the countries  to capture the spillovers industrially would raise the positive economic 
effects in the pick up area. 
 The cooperation case is focused on the inner circles in Figure 1. Here, the producing 
company contributes management competence and receives profitable cooperation within an 
industrial participation program in return.   
The business opportunity is that there is a profit to be earned from making the spillovers 
valuable for the local or receiving economy. To do that the producer/seller has to support 
local receiver competence as a profitable business in itself. For a developing economy well 
designed off-set trade arrangements are a method to create such a mutually beneficial win-win 
situation. For this to be the case off-set trade has to be oriented towards capturing technology, 
acquiring industrial competence and developing related and new production. Hence, part of 
the innovative pricing (Jonason 1999) strategy includes the art of  presenting a convincing 
                                                 
17 The notion of weak property rights is discussed in a similar context in Eliasson and Wihlborg (2003).   21   
case for the long-term industrial benefits of the deal.
18 Bundling the aircraft sale with an offset 
program designed to capture the spillovers locally is our example. Encouraging the 
establishment of  local venture capital firms to induce foreign and local investors to establish 
on the basis of the spillover flow is another example. In one sense such an “agreement” means 
establishing a commercially based industrial park (Eliasson 2000a).       
5.3  Boosting receiver competence through policy 
Important for the value being delivered to the local economy (including spillovers) is the 
competence of the local economy to receive it profitably, i.e. to base new businesses on 
spillovers. The product being sold in the case study to be presented below, therefore, is the 
hardware equipment itself plus the value of the spillovers. This value depends on it being 
identified and matched by the local ability to nurse a profitable business around the spillovers. 
Looked at this way the local economy around an advanced product acquisitions program faces 
a  positive sum game. This is the case irrespective of whether procurement is public or 
private. The policy task is, however, different.  
It is in the interest of the public customer to see the spillovers commercialized. But while the 
public customer will be satisfied with only seeing the spillovers picked up, the private 
customers will only be interested and willing to “ pay extra” if they can earn a private rent 
from the spillovers. In the case of advanced public purchasing the role of the policy maker, 
therefore, is to make sure that the local receiver competence is satisfactory i.e. that the 
competence bloc is vertically complete and horizontally varied. 
Hence, making full use of spillovers from advanced firms the local economy faces the general  
policy problem of supporting the  local receiver competence to identify and commercialize 
winning technologies . At the same time it is in the interest of the advanced firm to establish 
in a local economy well endowed with industrial receiver competence, since that receiver 
competence raises the total value of its product (including spillovers) to the local economy. 
However, only in the case of public procurement is the weak property rights problem ( to its 
spillovers) satisfactorily solved since the  government/customer is then directly interested in 
                                                 
18 Innovative pricing is a method developed to identify a base to price a product with weak property rights, for 
instance different kinds of digital services or (our case) spillovers that have to yield a return to make the whole 
product (aircraft and spillovers) profitable for the producer (see further Eliasson 1995: Ch. 15). Innovative 
pricing (IP) is needed  in situations with difficult to define multidimensional products,  many dimensions of 
which being unknown to,  or unavailable for most customers but also constantly changing. IP then amounts to 
defining the base (the dimensions of the product) to charge for. Jonason (2001) uses the theory of the 
experimentally organized economy (EOE, see eg. Eliasson 1991b, 2001a) to accommodate the very common 
situation of products, the quantities of which cannot be defined because of the many quality dimensions, a 
phenomenon recognized as normal already by Hayek (1937).   22   
seeing the economic value of its spillovers raised.. A broad industrial base, an educated and 
entrepreneurial labor force and a complete and varied competence bloc are supportive of that 
ambition. Even advanced industrial economies such as Sweden, however, may have a 
problem here. For industrially less advanced and developing countries the difficulties of 
taking advantage  on their own of the opportunities created are overwhelming. It should 
therefore  be mutually advantageous for the advanced firm gearing up for large scale 
production and distribution and the receiving country to engage in a mutually advantageous 
industrial participation program aimed at both boosting local receiver competence (of 
spillovers) and offering profitable business cooperation contracts to develop new businesses 
(cf. item 5 in Table 5). This gives a rational economic argument   for  offset trade 
arrangements, but only for contracts that trade long term industrial development for profitable 
business deals. The Jas-Gripen (Saab) sale to South Africa has  created  opportunities of this 
kind, when done right (Eliasson 2000b). Spillovers are a positive characteristics of an 
advanced product. They carry  extra value for the buyer and the local economy that depends 
on the local receiver competence to create a business on it.  
 
6.  Capturing the Direct and the Serendipitous Spillovers  
  – the Case of  Sweden’s Military Aircraft Industry 
19   
Swedish aircraft industry will now be used to demonstrate through case presentations the 
economic implications of technological spillovers. Concrete examples are needed to 
understand the economic nature of such spillovers. I have chosen Swedish aircraft industry 
because of the wealth of observed technology supply from that industry, and the fact that I 
can draw directly on an earlier study ( in Swedish, Eliasson 1995) and  complementary 
updating.  
The story begins with  a brief account of the economic significance of the industrial spillover 
cloud around Swedish Saab over its history, beginning when Svenska Aeroplan AB (SAAB) 
was established in 1937 as a separate company by Bofors together with a subsidiary of 
Electrolux, to build military airplanes for Swedish defense. I move gradually outwards 
through the circles of Figure 1, beginning with the core products in the inner circle, the 
military aircraft. 
 
                                                 
19 A much more detailed account is found in Eliasson (1995).   23   
6.1. The Product 
An aircraft is a complicated product with a very long life that requires an extremely complex 
and distributed production organization. The life length of the Swedish fourth generation 
multipurpose combat aircraft system JAS Gripen is illustrated by the fact that design of the 
aircraft platform began in 1980, the first prototype was flown in 1988, the first production 
aircraft  was delivered in 1993 and redesigned and modernized versions of the plane are 
expected to still be in duty by 2035, perhaps even by 2045 . The versions then flying will look 
quite similar to the first aircraft delivered in the 1990s, but they are entirely different aircraft 
when it comes to performance properties. Embedded electronics and software make  the 
difference. Hence, the New Generation Gripen first presented in April 2008 more or less 
looks the same as earlier versions, but has a stronger engine, can carry a much larger weapons 
load, has a 40 percent longer range, better avionics and above all the advanced electronics that 
makes all  this possible. The New Generation Gripen is faster than its closest  competitor the 
US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) from Lockheed Martin , and is available at half the price. 
An aircraft  integrates advanced mechanical technology with electronics, sensor technology, 
hydraulics,  new materials, communications systems  etc (Table 4). In military aircraft 
weapons systems have to be integrated with the aircraft, communications systems modified 
and encryption technologies installed etc. As will be further elaborated  below the upgrading 
of the fourth generation aircraft JAS Gripen  from its initial and generally designed  hardware 
platform  is largely a matter of redesigning the electronic software embodied in the aircraft.  
Contrary to other fourth generation military aircraft the JAS Gripen  software of the export 
version, the development of which began in 1995, even allows the aircraft to switch between 
fighter tasks, attack and surveillance in flight. Such flexibility in product design for 
customized uses is increasingly demanded of  complex products in industry , from 
automobiles to telephone systems. In this sense aircraft industry uses already today the 
production  technology of future engineering industry . This is one rational reason also for the 
advanced industrial nation to be concerned about having an inhouse aircraft industry. It 
functions as a technical university that delivers technology , education and training services 
free of charge to other firms in related industries and of a kind closer to  production and user 
processes  that the more academically inclined technical universities are incapable of 
developing and delivering (Eliasson 1996b). It is difficult and takes a very long time to 
develop such an industry. Only the  five countries on the UN Security Council plus Sweden  
have the capacity to develop and build a complete military combat aircraft system. Two more   24   
countries should be added if we include also small civilian passenger aircraft
20. This 
competence to develop a complete aircraft (with Saab in Sweden), including (see below) also 
a civilian regional aircraft , spills goodwill value to the entire Swedish engineering industry 
and might allow it to add a quality brand when pricing its products.  
The long life of the aircraft means that to enjoy its services as a user, maintenance and repair 
services have to be delivered over its life cycle and the product will have to be updated and 
modernized now and then . In fact, the electronics of a modern military aircraft and a large 
commercial aircraft is normally replaced one or two times, sometimes three times during its 
often more than 50 year life span. The early definition of the product, hence, should include 
both  the features that lower maintenance and repair costs and facilitate upgrading and 
modernization, and an understanding of the properties of the aircraft desired 50 years hence. 
Flexibility in basic structural design, hence, becomes an important product characteristic. 
Easy adaptability means product longevity, and product longevity means low life time costs 
for the user. This also means that the ability to manage product upgrades becomes critical for 
product life time costs. This  partly  explains why the user of  very complex products often  
outsources the management of the product system  over its life cycle to the producer. The 
producer understands the product better than the user. This began with aircraft and aircraft 
engines but is becoming common with expensive and complex products such as heavy trucks 
and telecom systems.  
      (Tables 4 and 5 in about here)        
(But this is not enough. Compared to a university an industrial firm delivers technology 
embodied in products that both functions (is operational) and to some extent has been tested 
in a market for commercial viability and/or usefulness. This means that an aircraft that has 
gone through both a functional and a market test spills industrial knowledge that has a greater 
value for civilian production than spillovers that are only technological. This again means that 
technological spillovers  is a misnomer. The spillovers documented econometrically around 
advanced US firms are industrial, i.e. both technological and commercial.
21 The commercial 
dimension of industrial knowledge also represents great economic value.) 
Two critical parts of a globally competitive engineering firm are (1) advanced product design 
and marketing competence and (2) ability to organize integrated production over global 
                                                 
20 They are France, Sweden, the UK, the US and  perhaps China and Russia. Canada, Italy and Brazil have to be 
added if we include small civilian aircraft. 
 
21 Read commercially tested (in the market) technology.   25   
markets. Product design, international marketing and organizational competence are typically 
developed in industry. Complex distributed and integrated production was pioneered in 
(military) aircraft industry (Eliasson 1996b). There is little of such hands on competence to 
learn in the classrooms of technical or commercial universities. Such knowhow diffuses as 
people move between jobs and firms in the market.  
An aircraft, hence, is not only a very complex product. It is multidimensional in the sense that 
it is composed of (1) the product itself as a physical entity, (2) many years of service, 
maintenance and upgrading and (3) a “cloud of valuable spillovers” that unfortunately, for the 
producer,  is close to impossible to charge for. Advanced firms, such as the aircraft 
manufacturers, therefore, generate different indirect (spillover) benefits over and above the 
product itself being purchased. In the short term local employment will be created, but this 
carries local value only if extra people employed cannot be gainfully employed elsewhere and 
the effects are only temporary. Sustainable production and  export  growth can only be 
achieved as a result of a sustainable increase in overall productivity growth generated by the 
spillovers. 
In fact, spillovers around Saab are found in all four circles in Figure 1, and I will go through 
some of them in the form of brief case stories. There is, however, one overriding 
organizational competence that I have called “integrated production” (Eliasson 1996b) that is 
generic to engineering industry, that first developed  in aircraft industry and currently is 
becoming the critical engineering technology associated with concepts such as 
modularization, outsourcing and distributed production and that is increasingly carrying the  
globalization of  production in the world economy.  The case presentations will be ex post in 
the sense that commercialized spillovers have been identified and their history and origin 
traced. Besides some historical observations most spillover cases therefore relate to Saab´s 
Viggen “ third generation” supersonic aircraft that used digital systems and computers 
extensively to achieve functionality, that is still on duty in the Swedish airforce and was first 





   26   
6.2  Civilian aircraft industry 
The most obvious direct spillovers around Saab (in the first circle of core technology) are the 
large civilian (regional) aircraft project of Saab and aircraft engine production (item 1 in 
Table 6).  
Civilian aircraft/projects have been attempted earlier in  the life of Saab (that began in 1937), 
but tended to be shelved when a new generation of military aircraft had to be developed fast. 
The first serious civilian project was initiated in 1974. In the late 1970s Saab identified 
around 30 passengers as the optimal size for a small civilian passenger aircraft to be used for 
short distances.  Saab was therefore  fortunate to have had the right business idea when the 
US air travel market was deregulated in 1978 and had  a fully engineered regional turbo prop 
plane (Saab 340) for 35 passengers ready for delivery already in 1984. Saab 340, therefore, 
soon became the world’s most sold regional aircraft in its size range. A larger and  quieter 
turboprop regional airplane for 58 passengers was developed and ready for delivery in 1994. 
Both the civilian aircraft and the military JAS Gripen projects were started at the same time, 
but this time the civilian project was realized because the Swedish Government demanded a 
civilian production project to complement  the JAS Gripen project. 
 The market for civilian aircraft is, however, as political as the market for military aircraft and 
many countries, notably Brazil, Canada, France, Germany and Italy subsidized their aircraft 
manufacturers heavily to establish - such was the ambition - a local technological spillover 
source supporting industrial development. With a market distorted by heavy subsidies  the 
commercial screening of the new technologies will be deficient (Eliasson 1995, 1996b) and 
the technological spillovers of dubious economic value to the nation. Without a government 
willing to pay handsomely for the spillovers the market for regional aircraft, however, went 
dead for private and not subsidized Swedish producers. We have a clear case for a need for 
innovative pricing, which was impossible in Sweden. Saab shut down its regional aircraft 
venture in 1999.
22   Saab´s civilian aircraft arm  is currently refocusing to become a developer 
and supplier of advanced subsystems to the two large aircraft companies Airbus and Boeing.  
In this reoriented business Saab  has been fairly successful in reemploying resources from the 
shut down regional aircraft venture. 
      (Table 6 in about here) 
                                                 
22 An additional reason was that regional jets were becoming competitive. However, this would have been no 
reason for Saab to shut down its civilian aircraft activity had it had an opportunity to sell its turbo prop planes for 
a profit to finance the further development of a regional jet.   27   
 
6.3  Innovative start ups around Saab – core technology 
The civilian aircraft project could only be realized on the basis of technology and experience 
from Saab´s military production. Some aircraft technology links exist, but not to the same 
extent, to the automobile manufacturing that Saab began already in 1946, a business that after 
many ups and downs was sold to GM in two stages in 1990 and 1999. The efficient cockpit 
design of the military aircraft was in part transferred to the Saab automobile and the need to 
press together the legs and arms of the pilot when catapulted out of a crashing aircraft led to 
the development of a primitive  airbag technology that was later in part  transferred to the 
automobile safety firm Autoliv. During the years 1969 to 1996 Saab and the heavy truck 
manufacturer Scania  were merged into one company Saab Scania with Swedish Investor as 
the main owner. This arrangement was, however, more financial than industrial and 
technological. 
Saab has systematically attempted  to develop new  businesses on its own spillovers. A very 
early Swedish computer industry, first developed within Saab, became a separate division and 
was incorporated as a separate company in the 1960s, finally to be acquired by Ericsson in 
1981. The Swedish computer industry, however, disappeared in the late 1980s with Ericsson’s 
large Business Information Systems failure (see Eliasson 2001b and 1965, chapters 12 and 
13). 
A cluster of high tech innovative start ups developed around Saab over the years. Some of 
them, for some time were organized under the Saab Combitech umbrella company. Some of 
them developed military technology (like Saab Missiles) many of them civilian technology. 
Some of them are currently part of the earlier Celsius operation that Saab acquired in 2000, 
and Saab is  selling some (notably Saab Marine Electronics) for good profit.  Saab 
Aerostructures, as mentioned,  has been successfully building up a presence as a specialized 
systems supplier to the large civilian aircraft manufacturers, and Saab has recently decided to 
use its military technology as the base for a move into the rapidly expanding civilian security 
market.  The difficult management problem, however, has been to identify and carry radically 
different technologies spilled from the military aircraft business  to successful industrial 
production and distribution within the parent’s management umbrella. 
6.4  Aircraft engines   28   
Volvo Aero (item 3 in Table 6) is a winner within the inner circle of core aircraft technology 
in Figure 1. The history of Volvo Aero (earlier Volvo Flygmotor) is as old as the Swedish 
airforce. It was founded in 1930 to build combustion engines (from 1949 jet engines) on 
license for Swedish military aircraft. Volvo Aero increasingly modified the engine design and 
added own technology. A complete jet engine (called the  Dovern) was developed in the mid-
1940s by another Swedish company (STAL). But for some reason the STAL project was 
terminated before reaching  industrial production. This military jet engine still exists in 
modified versions, among other things as back up electrical generators for ships, hospitals etc. 
Siemens acquired the business 2003 from ABB and is currently (SvD April 18. 2008) 
experiencing a booming demand for its turbines for steam generated electrical power based on 
solar energy. 
Volvo Aero’s management began worrying about the low civilian share of its production 
already during the 1970s (in 1970 only 5 percent) and began to systematically develop a 
civilian activity. This reorientation has been very successful and Volvo Aero civilian 
development and production of advanced components for the three large aircraft engine 
manufacturers (GE, Pratt & Whitney and Rolls Royce) currently exceeds 85 percent of sales. 
The reason for success (see Eliasson 1995, Ch. 10) may be the civilian production and 
marketing experience residing within the large Volvo group. Volvo Aero, furthermore, is also 
developing and producing gas turbines for a variety of civilian applications, including 
auxiliary power plants to hospitals. Energy efficient gas turbines, furthermore, are expected to 
capture new markets, for instance for home heating and perhaps also for  automobiles. 
6.5  Secondary related industrial spillovers from aircraft engines 
Two related industry spillovers within the two inner circles in Figure 1 should be mentioned. 
Volvo Aero Services is a direct spillover from the license manufacturing of a modified version 
of the Pratt & Pratt & Whitney civilian JT8D engine for the military  fighter aircraft  Viggen. 
JT8D is one of the most used civilian jet engines. It is mounted on all DC9s (and all MD 80s) 
and on Boeing 727. Producing this jet engine on license meant that Volvo Aero “learned the 
engine” and soon became an efficient modifier and maintenance operator. Hence, Volvo Aero 
(and also Government owned FFV Aerotech, but to a less extent) gradually developed a new 
business serving this civilian jet engine and increasingly also other civilian jet engines. The 
market is huge. A large civilian jet engine has a service life of at least 30 years, normally 
much more. Its life cost [data for the Swedish military version of the JT8D engine; Eliasson 
1995, p. 94] is one third for the engine purchase, one third for spare parts and one third for   29   
maintenance and repair. Again, to capture this business on the basis of spillovers requires 
considerable global organization and marketing competence. 
The market for these large engines, furthermore, is rapidly developing into one for renting 
rather than selling the engines. Engine manufacturers such as GE own the engine, and the 
carriers rent engine services in terms of hours of use , speed etc. Taking a life long 
responsibility for the product means that its design incorporates efficient maintenance, repair 
and modernization features. (This technology was first developed in the industry producing 
military and defense products but is now increasingly used by other producers of large, 
advanced and complex products with a long life.) 
Hydraulic pumps is another secondary spillover that became a winner (item 5, Table 6). The 
story illustrates  the nature of entrepreneurship. The Viggen  fighter aircraft  needed a stronger 
fuel pump, and Volvo Aero engineers identified  a design developed by US Sundstrand 
Corporation which had found no use for its invention. A license was acquired in 1969 and 
Volvo Aero engineers began modifying it for the Viggen. Somehow, they did not succeed and 
Volvo Aero faced the problem of how to recover the money invested in the license and the 
redesign. Even though the hydraulic pump was too weak for the military jet engine it was 
more than sufficient for heavy construction machinery. Volvo was first to grasp the 
significance of this and soon developed a global lead in the use of hydraulics in construction 
equipment. A separate company (Volvo Hydraulics) was started in 1983 and merged in 1992 
with the Atlas Copco subsidiary Monsun Tison into VOAC Hydraulics that employed about 
1000 people in 1995 when it was acquired by US Parker Hannifin.   
6.6  Integrated production   
Aircraft industry  faced  the need early to outsource  advanced development and production. 
Too many technologies and too many components had to be integrated in too many different 
ways to make it possible for one firm to develop and produce an entire aircraft. Hence, the 
technique of modularizing the design and outsource entire complexes of components of the 
aircraft  to subcontractors was developed. Integrated production (Fredriksson 1994, Eliasson 
1996b) is the art of integrating all these activities efficiently in the design and manufacturing 
process. The more advanced the product the less likely that specialized subcontractors can be 
found in the local neighborhood. A global technology of organizing integrated production 
developed as did various standards to facilitate the design and manufacturing processes. 
Obviously, the competence to participate in such a globally integrated production system   30   
requires long organizational learning and experience accumulation. Such learning can only be 
efficiently organized through participating actively in a dynamically competitive 
subcontracting system (item 3 in Table 1). 
      (Table 7 in about here) 
Integrated production has been made possible through the integration of C&C technologies 
and mechanical technologies. It makes a holistic view of both the product and of the 
production process possible (item 1, Table 7) as well as a geographical distribution of both 
product development and manufacturing. Simulation techniques (computational prototyping), 
furthermore, make “optimization” of complex designs (items 5 and 6) possible. For instance, 
maintenance and repair problems can be solved ahead of time (items 3 and 7) and costly ex 
post adjustments avoided (item 9). On the whole, C&C technology has made more efficient as 
well as flexible coordination in space, over geographical distance and over time possible. The 
economic benefits of this increased coordination capacity and flexibility are the largest for 
very complex and costly products that are produced under very complex circumstances using  
expensive subsystems and components, notably aircraft. On line design is part of this 
technology and in so far as aircraft production ( both civilian and military) is concerned 
reliable encryption is a critical part of the technology, as is precise measurement and quality 
control. And it is difficult to get all subsystems and components to fit when brought together 
for final assembly from different places in the world. This appears to be the main reason for 
the recent (2007/08) delivery delays of Airbus 380 and also for Boeing´s Dreamliner. The 
organizational technology of distributed and  integrated production was first developed in 
aircraft industry and is now diffusing to other advanced parts of engineering industry. It is 
increasingly becoming a critical competence element determining the ability of firms to 
participate in the globalization of  production  increasingly built on modularization, very 
precise measurement and strict quality control and outsourcing. Industrially developing 
economies also risk being shut out of the industrial learning process associated with being 
integrated within the emerging global production system if they do not get the opportunity to 
team up as a subcontractor with a Western firm. This establishes integrated production as a 
separate and critical engineering organizational technology. 
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6.7  Ericsson Mobile Telephony – a serendipitous spillover 
The reorganization of Ericsson into  the world’s leading mobile telephone systems  company 
is a nice and plausible story. Few would, however, expect that Ericsson owes a lot to military 
electronics for its success, and it is an embarrassing story that Ericsson top management  for 
years tried to suppress  development of radio telephony internally to free resources for its 
failed, but perhaps more logical, entrance into the business information systems market 
(Eliasson 1995, Ch. 12 & 13, 1996a:194ff). So the story is truly serendipitous and based on 
three positive circumstances; (1) a curious and innovative customer, the Swedish 
Telecommunications Agency (item 1 in Table 2C), that tried for years to push a reluctant 
Ericsson into Mobile Telephony, (2) the existence of a digital, modularized, switching 
technology within Ericsson (the Axe system) and (3) the lucky circumstance  that Ericsson 
military electronics had developed several technologies (notably four out of 14 technologies 
needed to compose a mobile telephone system, Eliasson 1995, pp. 102 ff) that were in place at 
the critical moment when the market became ready. One of the three legs missing, perhaps 
only one of the part technologies, and Ericsson most probably would no longer be an 
autonomous player in the highly competitive telecom systems  market. This  property of 
failing “analytical foresight”  and a top management that is neither curious nor attentive  is a 
natural attribute of an experimentally organized market economy that carries strong 
implications for the organization and the management of a firm (Eliasson 2005b). 
Competence bloc theory ( in Table 2C) brings the competent and active customer  and two  
innovations ( the AXE system and new military electronics technology)  together with the 
internal commercialization competence of a large firm that clicked in once the top 
management of Ericsson  understood that it had a winner inhouse . The entrepreneurial 
competence entered in the form of the stubborn manager of Ericsson Radio System (a 
subsidiary) that resisted top management pressure to terminate development work on radio 
telephony using a secret slush account provided from a military budget. When Ericsson top 
management finally realized they had a winner money was no problem (items 4 and 5) and 
industrial competence (item 6) to scale up was to some extent available internally.  Ericsson, 
however, was not an experienced player in the   consumer electronics markets and later  
merged its hand terminal business with Sony´s into a separate company, Sony Ericsson in 
2001 (Dagens Industri, February 21, 2001, pp. 18f), which  is currently the third or fourth 
largest player in the world.  
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6.8  Secondary spillovers – Ericsson HP Telecom and telecom control systems 
Ericsson HP Telecommunications (EHPT)  illustrates the importance of a mobile group of 
people that had learned to solve a particular type of problem. 
A modern  aircraft, and notably a fast, high performance jet fighter needs an on board  control 
system that sounds an alarm when something malfunctions, and preferably also corrects the 
situation by turning on a back up system. Saab´s Viggen was one of the first third generation 
combat aircraft which combined extensive use of digital electronics with mechanical 
technology. Already at the end of the 1960s a digital control system had been developed for 
the fighter version of Saab’s Viggen.  Also telecom networks need similar control systems to 
reorient traffic when one link crashes. Ericsson understood that there was a potential  demand 
for such a control system to monitor their large land based AXE switches and systems. They 
also understood that the experience from solving organizational programming problems for 
the Viggen control system would be useful here. Hence,  engineers from the military software 
development project were assigned to this civilian project. Towards the end of the 1970s the 
AOM 101 was ready to be installed in the AXE switches for Saudi Arabia and Australia. The 
AOM system was proprietary to Ericsson’s own telecom system. In 1990 an open Unix based 
TMOS control system was introduced. But the telecom control systems needed advanced 
computing technology that Ericsson did not have. Hence, a cooperation with HP was 
established and Ericsson HP Telecommunications (EHPT) was founded in 1992. There is no 
limit to the need for such systems in mobile and land-based telecom systems alone. Even 
though an even larger market  may exist outside the telecom area, Ericsson HP Telecom  
decided to stay within their own business.  The company  employed 1200 people in 2001. In 
2001 Ericsson acquired HP´s 40 percent share of EHPT and the company was  internalized 
within Ericsson. 
 
6.9  The emergence and disappearance of a Swedish computer industry
23 
Saab engineers could always  use more computing capacity to solve their design problems 
than was available. They were thus very early users of computers and advanced customers of 
the early computing industry. To solve their computing problems they, in fact, started to 
develop their own computers in conjunction with developing similar computers for their 
products/aircraft. They designed a vacuum tube based computer in the 1950s to support the 
                                                 
23 This section is presented in detail in Eliasson (2001b).   33   
design of F32 Lansen and F35 Draken. For aircraft missiles to be carried by the Viggen jet 
fighter Saab engineers designed a fully transistorized control computer already during the 
second half of the 1950s. This control computer was redesigned for civilian use in 1960 as 
Sank or D2. Hence, Saab had a fully transistorized computer ready about a year after the 
launching of RCA’s, Remington Rand’s and IBM’s transistorized computers. Saab was first 
in Europe with a transistorized computer, and had a minicomputer ready in 1962 which 
became the basis for DataSaab, the computer division within Saab that soon had some 3000 
employees and was later spun off as a separate company. Technologically, hence, Sweden and 
Saab were occupying a joint leadership position in the global market for transistorized 
computers in 1959/60 together with seven US manufacturers. DataSaab was acquired by 
Ericsson in 1981 as part of Ericsson’s failed venture into Business Information Systems. The 
budding Swedish computer industry died with that venture (more on this in Eliasson 1998). 
 
7.  Conclusions 
Swedish Aircraft industry was started as part of the Swedish defense effort in the 1930s in 
preparation for what was expected to come. At that time Sweden was an industrialized nation 
but not a leading industrial economy. 
As a not intended positive side effect the Saab company has been an impressive technology 
generator that has helped significantly to catapult Swedish manufacturing industry to several 
leading positions in the postwar period. Part of the spillovers has been picked up and been 
successfully industrialized in other companies within  Saab  but the most important success 
stories have occurred outside the Saab Group. Several attempts to commercialize spillovers 
have failed, but surprisingly many have left a permanent positive signum on Swedish 
manufacturing performance, not least a positive brand of Swedish technological prowess. 
When placed in the context of competence bloc theory these empirical facts can be 
systematically organized and presented in a consistent way to guide the policy maker. The 
competent customer not only contributes to product technology through an advanced 
procurement process. The customer is also a critical guiding party in the selection of winning 
ideas and projects to be carried to industrial scale production and distribution through the 
competence bloc. An important conclusion from this analysis has been the need to possess 
local receiver competence to make the local commercialization of spillovers possible. With 
joint production of the hardware product and associated spillovers and joint customer ship of   34   
the “dual character product”, as is normally the situation with public purchasing of defense 
products, there exists a mutually beneficial, a win-win  situation between the producer and the 
public customer to optimize the economic value of the spillovers. Rational marketing of the 
dual character product then involves helping to support local competence (receiver 
competence) to commercialize spillovers. Only when the public customer understands the 
value of the spillovers and needs local support to commercialize them can the producer charge 
for the spillovers.                 
  The analysis carries a strong message on policy. One  effective industrial policy role of 
Government is as a competent and demanding customer of public goods and services. As a 
customer the government knows what it wants. If the customer role is carried out competently 
there is little or no need to support inputs in the technology supply process.  Government 
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Source: Eliasson, Gunnar, 1999. Undervattensteknologi i industriell tillämpning. KTH,  TRITA.IEO-
R 1999:12. 
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Table 1.  New Technology is diffused 
1.  When people with competence move (labor market) 
2.  Through new establishment by people who leave 
  other firms (innovation and entrepreneurship) 
3.  When subcontractors learn from systems coordinating firm, and vice versa 
  (competent purchasing) 
4.  Technology is acquired through strategic acquisitions of small R&D 
  intensive firms (strategic acquisitions) 
5.   When competitors learn from technological leaders (imitation) 
6.  Through organic growth and learning in incumbent firms  
Source: G. Eliasson, 1995 Teknologigenerator eller nationellt prestigeprojekt? Exemplet svensk flygindustry (A 




Table 2A. The dominant selection problem 
Error Type 1: Losers kept too long 
Error Type II: Winners rejected 
Source: G. Eliasson - Å. Eliasson, 1996. The Biotechnological Competence Bloc, Revue d’Economie 
Industrielle, 78-4
0, Trimestre.  
 
 
Table 2B. The four mechanisms of Schumpeterian creative destruction and economic 
growth 
1.  Innovative entry 
  enforces (through competition) 
2.  Reorganization 
3.  Rationalization 
  or 
4.  Exit (shut down) 
Source: “Företagens, institutionernas och marknadernas roll i Sverige”, Appendix 6 in A. Lindbeck (ed.), Nya 
villkor för ekonomi och politik (SOU 1993:16) and G. Eliasson (1996a, p. 45).   
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Table 2C.  Actors in the competence bloc 
1.  Competent and active customers 
Technology Supply 
2.  Innovators who integrate technologies in new ways 
Commercialization process ( Technology Demand) 
3.  Entrepreneurs who identify profitable innovations 
4.  Competent venture capitalists who recognize and finance the entrepreneurs   
5.  Exit markets that facilitate ownership change 
6.  Industrialists who take successful innovations to industrial scale production  
Source: G. Eliasson - Å. Eliasson, 1996. The Biotechnological Competence Bloc, Revue d’Economie 
Industrielle, 78-4
0, Trimestre.  
 
 
Table 3.  Capturing the rents from spillovers 
1.  Joint production and customership  
2.  Establish in viable competence bloc 
3.  Establish joint ownership 
4.  Integrate vertically downstream 
5.  Engage in offset trade or industrial participation programs to support receiver 
competence. Create Win-Win situation. 
 
Table 4.  An advanced engineering product integrates: 
(1)  Advanced mechanical technology 
(2)  Computer and communications (C&C) technology 
(3)  Sensor technology and 
(4)  Hydraulics and  
(5)  New materials 
Source: En teknologigenerator eller ett nationellt prestigeproject? – exemplet svensk flygindustri). 
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Table 5.   A military aircraft is 
(1)  an extremely complicated product with 
(2)  a very long life that is 
(3)  produced under very complex circumstances. 
Source: En teknologigenerator eller ett nationellt prestigeproject? – exemplet svensk flygindustri). 
   Stockholm: City University Press. 
 
Table 6.   Spillovers from Saab Military Aircraft Activities 
(1)  Saab civilian aircraft production 
(2)  The innovation market around Saab Scania 
(3)  Aircraft engines (Volvo Aero) 
(4)  The maintenance and modernization market for aircraft and aircraft engines 
      (Volvo Aero Services) 
(5)  Hydraulic engines (Volvo Aero and VOAC) 
(6)  Integrated production   
(7)  Mobile telephony (Ericsson)  
(8)  Telecom Control Systems (Ericsson – Hewlett Packard Telecom AB, EHPT  ) 
(9)  Computers and information systems 
(10) Etc. 
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Table 7.  Integrated production allows the following advantages over regular 
production   
    
1.  A holistic view of production processes based on functional modules, exactly defined 
interfaces  and competently  organized design teams make delegation of work combined 
with central control of product performance characteristics possible. 
2.  Development and manufacturing can be distributed geographically and outsourced over 
many subcontractors. 
3.  The holistic view minimizes expensive mistakes (design errors, bulky devises and badly 
organized manufacturing flows). 
4.  Product development and manufacturing processes can be integrated. 
5.  Among many possible ways of organizing production, it becomes possible to choose one 
of the best. 
6.  Simulation techniques (computational prototyping) make efficient product solutions 
possible from the beginning. Large cost reductions can be achieved. 
7.  Maintenance and modernization problems can be anticipated and solved already at the 
design stage. 
8.  The manufacturing process can be organized for one-piece production, short production 
runs as well as volume production. 
9.  Quality control becomes more efficient and can be reduced. Costly after production 
adjustments can be avoided. 
Source: Eliasson (1995), pp. 48 ff.   40   
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